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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Case No. 862054 
Priority No. 13 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Has the Petitioner generally failed to show, Under 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, considera-
tions 1, 2, 3 or 4 that the Petitioner is entitled to a Writ 
of Certiorari or review of the Utah Court of Appeals deci-
sion affirming the lower Court? 
2. Has the Petitioner failed to show, under Rule 43 of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, that there is a con-
flict between the decision rendered by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in this case and other decisions made by the Utah 
Court of Appeals; that the decision by the Utah Court of 
Appeals interpreting a State statute is contrary to a deci-
sion by this Court; or that the Utah Court of Appeals deci-
sion in this case has strayed from prior decisions of this 
1 
Court, such that this Court should exercise its supervisory 
position concerning a retirement division? 
3. Does this Court of Appeals decision conflict with 
other decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals or has it-
strayed so far from orior decisions of this Court as to 
require this Court to exercise its supervisory position in 
regards to an award of alimony? 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
Petitioner has petitioned for a Writ of Certiorari as 
being sought pursuant to Rules 42 and 43 of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner and Respondent were married on the 7th day 
of March, 19 59, in Sunset, Davis County, State of Utah. 
There have been born five (5) children as issue of the 
marriage, all of which children dre now emancipated. (TR. 
106) 
Respondent is employed at Hill Air Force Base and her 
gross income is approximately $2,000.00 gross per month 
(TR. 103) and she has accumulated approximately $15,856.83 
in retirement. (TR. 106) 
The Petitioner is medically disabled and receives civil 
service retirement disability in the amount of $655.48 \)er 
2 
month. (TR. 106) That retirement which Petitioner is 
currently receiving is valued at approximately $50,000,00. 
(TR. 106) 
In 1960, a home was built by the parties upon property 
given to the Defendant, which property is currently unencum-
bered and the appraised value of the property is $61,5 00,00. 
(TR. 96-108) The appraised value of the land itself is 
$16,000.00. (TR. 117) 
A Trial Court specifically found that the Petitioner is 
employable and in fact, that the Petitioner has been em-
ployed in the past and that he is presently looking for 
work. (Findings of Fact, page 4) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD DEMY PETITIONER'S WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI AS LACKING PROPER CHARACTER OF REASONS UNDER RULE 
43 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court entitled 
"Considerations Governing Review of Certiorari" deals with 
jurisdiction of a Writ of Certiorari from the Court of 
Appeals to the Supreme Court. The Rule indicates that 
review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right* but 
of judicial discretion, ar)6 will be granted only when there 
7 
are special and important reasons therefore. The Rule then 
goes on to indicate the character of reasons that will be 
considered in granting a Writ of Certiorari to review a 
Court of Appeals decision. 
The first reason is as follows: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Ap-
peals has rendered a decision in con-
flict with the decision of another panel 
of the Court of Appeals on the same 
issue of law.... 
In the instant case, after a review of the Respondent's 
subsequent points of argument, it should be evident to this 
Court that the Petitioner has failed to cite this Court to 
any conflict which this Court of Appeals affirmation has 
with the decision of another panel of the Court, of Appeals 
on the same issues of law and therefore certiorari should 
not be allowed on this basis. 
The second reason indicated is as follows: 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Ap-
peals has decided a question of State or 
Federal law in a way that is in conflict 
with the decision of this Court;.-.. 
In the instant case, although the Petitioner has re-
ferred the Court to a Utah State law, to-wit: Utah Code 
Annotated §30-35-5 in its Table of Authorities and initial 
paragraph to Point 2, the Petitioner does not further refer 
this Court to any interpretation by the Court of Apneais in 
4 
the instant case which would conflict with the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court, therefore the Writ of Certiorari 
should be denied on this point. 
The third reason indicated by Rule 4-3 is as follovs: 
(3) When a panel of the Courlt of Ap-
peals has rendered a decision tjnat is so 
far departed from the accepted land usual 
course of judicial proceedings las so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
Court as to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision'; or,-,. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals has simply exercised 
its discretion based on other case law ias the Respondent's 
further points of argument will demonst|rate and this panel 
of the Court of Appeals has not rendered a decision that is 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings nor has it sanctioned such a departure by the 
lower Court, such as to call for an exer|cise of this Court's 
power of supervision, therefore the Writ of Certiorari 
should be denied as lacking foundation on the third basis of 
Rule 43, 
The fourth consideration of Rule 43 has not been stated 
as a reason by this Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari. 
Wherefore, based on Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court as cited above and afteri a careful review of 
the Respondent's other points of argument this Court should 
5 
deny Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari as lacking in the 
judicial grounds and allow the decision of the Court of 
Appeals to stand. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DECISION IN REGARDS TO OFFSETTING RETIREMENT ASSETS OF THE 
PARTIES, SUCH THAT CONSIDERATIONS UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ARE NOT MET AND A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI SHOULD RE DENIED AS TO RETIREMENT. 
This Honorable Court held in Burnham vs . Burnham, 716 
P,2d 781 (Utah 1986) that the Trial Court is permitted 
considerable discretion adjusting the financial and property 
interest of the parties through a divorce action and its 
determinations are entitled to a presumption of validity. 
Although the Appellant Courts may weigh the evidence and 
substitute their judgment for that of the Trial Court in 
divorce actions, this Court further stated in Turner vs. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982) as follows: 
This Court will not do so lightly and 
merely because its judgment may differ 
from that of the Trial Judge, The Trial 
Court's apportionment of property will 
not be disturbed unless it were to such 
manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
In the immediate case at hand, the Petitioner/Appellant 
6 
was denied any i n t e r e s t i n t h e R e s o n n d e» - • s ^o' i rerronf \> f 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , but in - \ ,- -, ane v r i * . >••; pi: •.. i f: r; ?. 
was also d e n i e d any i n t e r e s t i ? i the Pe t it i on e r/A ppe11 a n t ' s 
r e t i r e m e n t of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . The R e s p o n d e n t ' s 
r e t i r e m e n t is s p e c u l a t i v e , as she is not c u r r e n t l y r e c e i v i n g 
any r e t i r e m e n t i n c o m e , w h e r e a s f h e r e t i r e in e n t o f t h e P e t i -
t i o n e r / A p p e l l a n t is c u r ren 11y ! *e i n g drawn,. 
The P e t i t i o n e r cites this C o u r t to Utah S u p r e m e C o u r t 
c a s e s of Pegu v s . D o a u , 65? P. 2d 1 3 0 8 (Utah 1 9 8 ? ) and 
E n g l e r t y_s^ E n q l e r t , 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) to inform 
this C o u r t t h a t the Trial C o u r t has a d u t y to make an e q u i t -
able d i v i s i o n of all of the a s s e t s of every nature p o s s e s s e d 
by the p a r t i e s w h e n e v e r o b t a i n e d and from w h a t e v e r s o u r c e 
d e r i v e d , i n c l u d i n g p e n s i o n , funds or in sura n o - r; a d-:'--prce 
a c t i o n . The Trial C o u r t , in its f i i i d i n g s , d i ci s p e c i f i c a l l y 
value the r e t i r e m e n t f u nds of ea ch of the na r t i e c :- *• A d ^  H 
make w h a t it c o n s i d e r e d an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n ;»? ho-° t^he 
real and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y and r e t i r e m e n t -"-.r.r.- • av, .•.:-.- J 
the r e t i r e p •- p 1 *: \; *•; r - * r t h (•• i p n A v i d u a 1 p o s s e s s o r c -;, n d ^ w n e * > 
or a r e t i r e s en J. . \ •••" .;.:••? .,'Vf:f 5 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 to t"r-e fi^non-
d e n t and a re t i r e P e n t f u nd o f a pprox i n a t e 1 y ; • ' . -• •' . -• ' •) 
the Peti ti o n e r / A p p e l ! <"'' r ^ "h<-' \ ^ i ; r r is no direct- c o n f l i c t 
o f the A n p e 1 1 a nt !" • • u r r ri e - •. * •.•f• \;I t.n t.ne Su p r e m e Cou r t 
7 
decision pursuant to consideration 3 of Rule 43 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Next the Petitioner/Appellant requests of this Court a 
different division of the property in the divorce action, 
which would entitle the Petitioner to one-half (h) of the 
Respondent's retirement and offsetting this amount against 
Plaintiff's share of the Trial Court's determined equity of 
the marital home while failing to make any provision for the 
Respondent to receive one-half (u) of the Petitioner/Appel-
lant's retirement. The Petitioner cites this Court to two 
(2) Appellant Court decisions in support of considerations 2 
and 3 of Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, but 
does not cite this Court to any particular interpretation of 
the Utah statute relied on, to-wit: §30-35-5 of the Utah 
Code Annotated. 
The first Utah Court of Appeals case cited is that of 
Bailey vs. Bailey, 70 U.A.R. 20 (Ct. Apo. 11-13-87) which 
indicates that under their interpretation of Woodward the 
distribution of retirement benefits should generally be 
postponed until benefits are received or at least until the 
earner is eligible to retire, and that this is particularly 
true where there is a sparsity of other divisible assets. 
However, the Trial Court retains the discretion to divide 
8 
•' r ?\ s ". t> t ^ if 1
 i r e t h e r e t i r e m e n t a c c o u 11t, u i - j f »•• •>" : -. 
t h e d i v o r c e is e n t e r e d , M " v i • ••: • - . . -^ • i x e r c i ^ e o , 
t h e C o u r t m u s t m a k e s p e c i f i c • i n^s a s ? «"• reason*, t-»r inmedi-
a r e » ! i •* t r i ••... ? •« -' . I n the i mi ed i a te c a sf a ' h:M;^ , r he Trial 
Court considered an offset of the $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 sone odd pre-
s e n t value of the P1 a i »: r i *-' f ' ^ retire n e n t, fa u t disaqreed v; i t h 
that offset as he had the discretion to d o a nd s pe cif ic a 11y 
found a^ f •. 1 1 ows : 
The 0 e f e n d a n t i n t h is case h a s a r i q h t 
to receive retirement income in the 
amount of $650.00 olus dollars oer 
m o n t h . The present value of the right 
to receive for somebody his aae should 
be valued far in excess of $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . 
And I think there should be some kind of 
offset on that side. 
Also I a m c o n s i d e r i n o r h a <• •: r, e r e i <- a 
basis for his medical n\t. i re pen t, a^d 
that some sort of physical d i s a b i l i t y . 
So if I wanted to charge him with the 
full va 1 i ie of a r • nht * o f " -i ve M-*f, 
it would probably be upward: of around 
$ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 . Rut "what I i n t m d t n do is 
offset the two r e t i r e m e n t s . The Plain-
tiff is er-tiilr;1 h e i s 
disabled . 
The Tr i al Or-..; •• r 
merits >-;?rv asset', c 
retirement h e; o e f i f •> 
t i o n e r / -.r- I 'i a !=' - M M 
e n t i t l e d t o h i s . A n d I a m c o n s i d e r i n g 




 -' o "nr-r p Y t ef- t. 
, o n s i f' e r , ' • n • n a o a r . ' h a -r t h o . -1 i ) e -
t h & r. a r i , i , -, . i - > • • i h e 
,-; f '..'*'• • n f -?p c ?)o r r ~ • ! t J »„: ['.-- H- i -
'. -i - r' '• - • ' j !, > a i i u w i 11 ^  u ft o f t s e t L f 
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$15,000.00 of the Respondent's retirement, which according 
t 0
 Bai1ey would be a present value as compared to the Peti-
tioner/Appellant's retirement of $50,000.00, which he is 
currently receiving. Based on these facts and the Bai1ey 
case, there is no conflict of decisions of the panel of the 
Court of Appeals regarding the Bailey case and the Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied. 
Secondly, the Petitioner refers this Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals case of Rayburn vs. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 
(Utah App. 1987) wherein the Utah Court of Appeals found 
that the Respondent, wife in that matter, was entitled to 
one-half (k) of the present value of the Appellant, hus-
band's, retirement, to be payable over a five (5) year 
period with interest, allowing the payor to make those 
payments as if they were alimony, entitling him to tax 
deductions. In Raybu rn, the Respondent, wife, had not 
worked for several years during the marriage nor did she 
have a retirement fund of her own. The Respondent in 
Rayburn was al1 owed . one-half {%) interest in her husband's 
retirement account as allowed by law. In the immediate case 
at hand, the Respondent, Mrs. Clontz, acknowledges the fact 
that not only is the Petitioner/Appellant entitled to one-
half [h) of her retirement account, but likewise she is 
10 
entitled to one-half {h) of his retirement account, and that 
the Court has fully considered all of the assets of the 
marital estate and made an equitable distribution thereof by 
awarding to each of the parties their own retirement ac-
counts. Additionally the Trial Court, by making such an 
award, has, as found in Rayburn, "avoided leaving the par-
ties in a financial entanglement that would continue for 
several years and would probably result in further Court 
hearings and cause future animosity between the parties". 
Both Respondent and the Petitioner/Appellant are each 
entitled to one-half {h) of the value of the retirement that 
each has accrued during their marriage. Any accrual of 
benefits subsequent to the divorce become the sole and 
separate property of each party and should not be considered 
as the Petitioner/Appellant, which he requests this Court to 
do. The Respondent's retirement is a potential income 
whereas the Petitioner/Appellant's retirement for disability 
is a current paying asset and income, giving to the Peti-
tioner/Appellant the sum of $650.00 plus per month. Again 
the Court considered both retirements as assets of the 
marital estate, considered the values of each of those 
assets, $15,000,00 as compared to upwards of $50,000.00, 
considered the fact that it was a disabilitv retirement that 
11 
was currently paying an income as opposed to the Respon-
dent's expectancy of income in the future and decided to 
offset those assets, which is clearly within the discretion 
of the Trial Court and is not in conflict with the Utah 
Court of Appeal's decision of Raybu rn vs. Rayburn under 
subparagraph 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, therefore the Writ should be denied. 
Lastly, the Petitioner/Appel1 ant refers this Court to 
the Utah State statute §30-35-5, but fails to cite this 
Court to any decision of the panel of the Court of Appeals 
that has decided a Question of that State law as it con-
flicts with the decision of this Court, such that the Writ 
of Certiorari should be denied. 
Wherefore, the decision of the Trial Court regarding 
the retirement benefits of the parties, which has been 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, should not be reviewed by 
this Court on a Writ of Certiorari as the Petitioner/Appel-
lant has failed to show that the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another 
panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law, nor 
has the Petitioner/Appellant the panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of State law which in any way 
conflicts with the decision of this Court, nor has the 
12 
Petitioner/Appellant shown that a panel of the Court, of 
Appeals has rendered a decision as departeld from the accept-
ed usual course of judicial proceedings or sanction a de-
parture by the lower Court which would call! for an exercise 
of this Court's power of supervision a|s alleged by the 
Petitioner/Appellant, such that this Cotirt should deny a 
Writ of Certiorari for review of the is£ue of awarding of 
the retirement benefits in the immediate case at hand. 
POINT 3 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AFIFIPHING THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION IN REGARDS TO ALIMONY HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY 
THE PETITIONER TO MEET ANY OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDER RULE 
43 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THEREFORE THE 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN REGARDS TO ALIMONY SHOULD BE DENIED. 
This Court held in Higley vs. H i g| 1 ey, 676 P.2d 379 
(Utah 1983) that an Appellant Court will not disturb the 
Trial Court's award of alimony payments unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is sholwn and this Court 
further held in Graff vs. Graff, 699 P.|2d 765 (Utah 1985) 
that the burden is on the attacker to sho^ that the evidence 
does not support the findings. 
In consideration of an alleged error of the Trial Court 
to award alimony to the Peti ti oner/ Appel liant, the Petitioner 
13 
has not referred this Court to considerations 2 or 4 govern-
ing review of certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, but only two (2) considerations, 1 and 
3. 
The Petitioner has referred this Court to several Court 
of Appeal cases. Firstly, the Petitioner refers this Court 
to Petersen vs. Petersen, 58 UAR 28 (Ct. App. 1987). In 
this case, the Court of Appeals held that an award of a 
medical degree, as part of a property distribution, would be 
better awarded as alimony payments, Mrs. Petersen, at the 
time of the divorce, had no income and was able to obtain 
recertification for teaching, but the possibility of secur-
ing a teaching contract was speculative at best. The Court 
further found that she had no outside income, would have to 
recertify and that she had not been employed outside the 
home for the last fifteen (15) years and based on those 
factors and the income of Dr. Petersen, she was awarded a 
$2,000.00 a month in alimony. 
In the immediate case at hand, the Trial Court found as 
follows: 
As far as alimony is concerned, I am not 
going to award alimony. The Defendant 
has $650.00 plus dollars per month 
retirement. There is no indication that 
he is not employable. In fact, the 
evidence is he has been employed in the 
14 
past. He is looking for work at the 
present time. 
There is no indication in the Petitioner's case, as in Mrs. 
Petersen's case, that he had no outside income. In fact, 
the Petitioner is receiving $650.00 per month from a dis-
ability retirement, which he can supplement with employment. 
Petitioner has worked outside the home contrary to Mrs. 
Petersens not working outside the home fbr the last fifteen 
(15) years. Petitioner is employable, he does not have to 
seek recertification as Mrs. Petersen wis required to and 
there is no conflict with the Petersen decision by the Court 
of Appeals and the reaffirmation of the lower Court's deci-
sion in this case by the Court of Appeals, 
Secondly, the Petitioner cites this Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals case of Talley vs. Talley, 61 MAR 31 (Utah 
App. 1987) wherein the Utah Court of Appeals found that the 
Plaintiff, with a net income of $953.00 a month, and the 
Defendant, with a net income of $2,018.00 per month, that 
the Plaintiff was entitled to an award of alimony of $250.00 
per month for the first two (2) years and $150.00 per month 
for the following three (3) years after the Court had con-
sidered the required factors found in Eames vs. Eames, 735 
P.2d 395 (Utah ApD. 1987). Again, the facts in the immedi-
ate case at hand differ somewhat from tjhose of Tal 1 ey ys. 
15 
Tal ley. In this case, the Petitioner is not working, but 
has a guaranteed income during disability of $650.00 a month 
which can be supplemented by outside employment and the 
Court did find that he was employable in reviewing the three 
(3) factors of Eames, which are: 
1. The financial condition and needs of the receiving 
spouse, 
2. The ability of the receiving spouse to produce a 
sufficient, income for himself or herself and 
3. The ability of the paying spouse to provide sup-
port. 
The Court further found that the Petitioner was capable 
of employment, was indeed looking for employment and had 
worked in the past. The affirmation of the lower Court 
decision by the Court of Appeals is not in conflict with the 
decision rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals in Talley vs 
Tal1ey, therefore the Writ of Certiorari for review by this 
Court should be denied. 
Thirdly, the Petitioner refers this Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals case of Eames vs. Eames, 55 UAR 49 (Ct. 
App. 1987). Petitioner points out that in the Eames case, 
the Court awarded alimony in view of the parties ages and 
education, as well as the length of their marriage and 
16 
substantial disparity in incomes and their earning poten-
tial. 
Again the factual basis of the incident case and the 
Eames case are substantially different, in that: 
The Trial Court did not find a substantial disparity in 
the incomes nor in their ages or education, but found it 
contrary that, the Petitioner was empldyable, had worked 
outside of the home and was currently looking for work and 
was receiving over $650,00 a month as a type of guaranteed 
income for which the Petitioner expended po hours and there-
fore could supplement that income with additional work time, 
such that there exists no conflict between the affirmation 
of the lower Court's decision and that off the Utah Court of 
Appeals decision in Eames. 
Next, the Petitioner refers this Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals case of Boyl e vs. Boy!e, 5 5 UAP. 51 (Utah 
Ct. 1987) wherein the Plaintiff, wife, was not awarded 
alimony in a seven (7) year marriage with no children based 
on the fact that the Plaintiff, wife, Had previously re-
ceived several months of temporary alimony to give her an 
opportunity to rehabilitate. Those are essentially the 
facts in the immediate case, in that the Petitioner is 
receiving over $650.00 a month for disability retirement and 
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was found to be employable and had and could work outside of 
the home, such that the Petitioner is receiving income for 
an opportunity to rehabilitate and can supplement that 
income by employment outside of the home so that again there 
is no conflict between the decisions rendered by the Court 
of Appeals and the Writ should be denied. 
Next, the Petitioner refers this Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals case of Lee vs. Lee, 69 UAR 51 (Utah App. 
1 9 8 7 ) . The Petitioner fails to point out that the wife was 
married at the age of twenty (20) with a high school educa-
tion and clerical skills and had devoted her time to raising 
the couples two (2) children and working for the income 
producing asset that was awarded to the husband and she was 
awarded no income producing assets or cash and had failed to 
find employment despite her persistent efforts. The Court 
of Appeals simply reversed and remanded the case to the 
Trial Court to fix alimony in light of the three (3) factors 
a r t i c u 1 a t e d a b o v e . 
Again the facts differ substantially from those of the 
immediate case, wherein the Petitioner has income of over 
$650.00 a month based on disability retirement, the Respon-
dent was not awarded an income producing asset of the marri-
age, while Petitioner was awarded the home, which he could 
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either mortgage, remain in the home or s^l 1 out right, such 
that he will not incur the expense of moving a mobile home 
currently situated on someone elses property. A careful 
consideration of these facts as compared with those of the 
immediate case, once again show that th^re is no conflict 
with the decisions of the Courts of Appeal and the Writ 
should be denied. 
Lastly, the Petitioner refers this Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals case of Canning vs. Canning, 68 UAR 16 (Ut. 
App. 1987), Again a comparison of the facts between the two 
(2) cases will show that there is no conflict between the 
decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and these two (2) 
cases. The Court of Appeals found in Canhi ng that the Court 
did not consider making a finding of Mrsi. Canning's current 
future ability to work, while quite the contrary was found 
here. The Petitioner/Appellant presented evidence of his 
inability to work and the Court found that he was able to 
work, he was employable and was, in fact, looking for work. 
Additional facts in the Canning case indicate that she had 
earned about $1,200.00 during the prior year, she had only a 
high school education and insignificant job skills to 
market, that her off and on work was always in the minimum 
wage category. That her ability to work was impaired by an 
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ulcer and by the disabilities of her minor sons, both of 
which were handicapped, by learning disfunctions. One was 
being treated by a psychologist for emotional problems. She 
was seeking a flexible work schedule so she could devote 
necessary time to their special needs and the Court of 
Appeals found that it was doubtful that she could find and 
keep a full time job and even if she were able to do so, her 
earnings would be minimual for an extended period. 
The Trial Court considered the testimony offered by the 
Petitioner/Appellant and found that he was employable and 
did not find that the Petitioner, in this case, had the 
special disabilities that Mrs. Canning had in taking care of 
minor children with learning disfunctions, and that she 
actually had minimual work experience. To the contrary, the 
Trial Court found that the Petitioner had worked outside of 
the home and was employable and again, in addition to that, 
he was receiving over $650.00 a month in disability payments 
which could be supplemented, whereas Mrs. Canning had only 
earned $100.00 per month during the prior year. The deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals in the immediate case and the 
Canni ng case are not in conflict when all facts are consid-
ered and the Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
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Wherefore, Petitioner has failed to ihow, in regards to 
a request of review of the Trial Court'k failure to award 
alimony that there is any conflict betwelen the affirmation 
of the lower Court by the Utah Court of Appeals or other 
Utah Court of Appeal decisions pursuant io consideration to 
Rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Supreme Cpurt and the Peti-
tioner has also failed to show that this decision of the 
Court of Appeals has so far departed fro|m the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or Idas sanctioned such 
a departure by the lower Court as to call for an exercise of 
this Court's power of supervision, therefore the Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
A careful review of the facts and caie law presented by 
the Petitioner, wherein the Petitioner alleges that there 
are conflicts between this Court of Appeals decision and 
other decisions of the Court of Appeals, or that the Court 
of Appeals has decided a question of Stjate law is in con-
flict with the decision of this Court, or that a panel of 
the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that is depart-
ed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has sanctioned such a departure by the lower Court 
as to call for the exercise of this Court's power of super-
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vision have not been substantiated by the Petitioner, such 
that the Writ of Certiorari, under Rule 43 of the Rules of 
the Utah Suprene Court should be denied and the affirmation 
of the Utah Court of Appeals of the Trial Court's decision 
should be allov/ed to stand, and the Respondent awarded her 
attorney's fees and costs in defending this Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of January, 19P>8. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that four (4) copies of the forego-
ing Respondent's Brief in Opposition to 'Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari was placed in the United Sjtates ma i }, postage 
prepaid on this 12th day of January, 1988 to: 
Attorney Deirdre A. Gorman 
Bamberger Square, Building 1 
205 26th Street, Suite 34-
Ogden, Utah 84401. ,--" 
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